



# SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT; SOUTH EAST REGION; EBONYI.

Prepared for: NCDC / Nigeria CoPREP

**OPERATING IN AN  
UNCERTAIN WORLD**

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

CoPREP	COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Project
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
GoN	Government of Nigeria
NCDC	Nigeria Center for Disease Control
NPF	Nigerian Police Force
NPHCDA	National Primary Health Care Development Agency
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corp
PCU	Project Coordinating Unit
SMF	Security Management Framework
SRA	Security Risk Assessment
VAC	Vaccination Approval Criteria
WB	World Bank
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
ESN	Eastern Security Network
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth Development Office
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
CCTV	Close Circuit Television
CMT	Crisis Management Team
RTA	Road Traffic Accident
MED EVAC	Medical Evacuation
DSS	Department of State Services
LGA	Local Government Area
OCG	Organized Criminal Groups
ROE	Rules of Engagement

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

The scope of this Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is specific to Ebonyi, Nigeria. This assessment and report were produced in January 2022. Risk scenarios were identified, and a vulnerability analysis was conducted relative to project personnel activity. A series of mitigation measures were identified for each to reduce personnel risk to as low as practical. The recommended mitigation measures are included in this report and should provide the basis for security plans for activity in the city.

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# 1. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY SITUATION.

The scope of this Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is specific to Ebonyi State, Nigeria. This assessment and report were produced in January 2022. Risk scenarios were identified, and a risk assessment was conducted relative to project activity in the state. A series of mitigation measures were identified for each to reduce personnel risk to as low as reasonably practical. The recommended mitigation measures are included in this report and should provide the basis for security plans for project activities moving forward.

Ebonyi state is one of the states in the southeast region in Nigeria with its largest city 'Abakiliki' as the state capital. It has an estimated population of 4,816,675 persons, who are of the Igbo ethnicity and can be said to be an agriculturally driven people.

The state has been reported to have other solid mineral resources as well, but its people have been more focused on agri and agro related businesses. The state is not a fast-paced state with lots of people migrating in, instead it is a calm and organized economy that shares boundaries with four other states, Benue, Enugu, Cross Rivers and Abia states, respectively.

The state covers a land mass of 5,533 km<sup>2</sup> with 13 Local Government Areas. It has no air or seaport, so most of its transportation is by land via road. The closet airport is the Akanu-Ibiam International Airport, Enugu, approximately 72.1km from Abakiliki.

The NCDC office in Abakiliki is situated within State Government Ministry of Health where they share communal areas with other public health related agencies like the NPHCDA/SPHCDA. The facility is in a fenced and organized environment with guards and access control measures in place.

Ebonyi is assessed as a MEDIUM-RISK state.

## 1.1. TERRORISM.

The state and region over the past 2 years have experienced a series of violent attacks by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and Eastern Security Network (ESN). The groups have organised several actions, such as the sit-at-home protests, that have been enforced through violence. The Nigerian Government prescribed the IPOB group as a terror organisation. Despite security force operations, which have met with some success, the armed wing of IPOB (ESN) continues to prosecute attacks against the police and army. The IPOB and ESN groups have so far ignored immunization work in the state and region. However, if vaccination programmes begin to be seen as affiliated with politics, they may become a target for these violent groups. This threat has been rated as **MEDIUM**.

## 1.2. CRIME

Crime is a pervasive major threat in the state, especially within large towns and the capital Abakiliki. Nigeria's unemployment rate is currently at 33% as at January 2022, which in turn fuels crime. Crimes like mugging, armed robbery, burglary, carjacking, assault, kidnapping and extortion regular occurrences. Staff of the programme could be perceived as well off and thus exposed to criminal attacks like kidnap or mugging. This threat is rate as **MEDIUM** Risk.

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### 1.3. CIVIL UNREST.

Ebonyi and the whole south-eastern region have had a significant escalation of pro-Biafra protests over the past 18 months. These protests have led to the declaration of sit-at-home orders and the ban on the singing of the Nigerian National Anthem by IPOB and ESN. Civil unrest in several rural communities in the state could affect staff on vaccination exercises. This threat is rated as **MEDIUM** for the state. The threat of civil unrest can be reduced to LOW if the measures recommended are put in place.

### 1.4. TRAVEL RISK.

According to the 2021 second quarter statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics, Ebonyi had one of the lowest road traffic accident figures in the country. Ebonyi state recorded 29 RTA cases from an 86-country average, 19 of these were serious incidents within which 9 deaths were recorded. Travel risk remains a major threat to life of personnel working within the project. Without a standard travel management procedure or a crisis management structure this threat is rated as **MEDIUM** Risk. If measures can be put in place within the project this threat can be brought down to NEGLIGIBLE Risk.

### 1.5. KIDNAP.

According to the PLSO Incident Data Report for 2021, Ebonyi only had three recorded kidnap incidents in 2021. Regardless of this figure, kidnap remains a major threat to personnel working on the vaccination programme. This threat is rated as **MEDIUM** risk but could be reduced to LOW Risk with mitigation measures in place.

### 1.6. MEDICAL EMERGENCY.

Ebonyi is among states that experience the yearly Lassa fever outbreak. This is among several other tropical diseases that could be overlooked in the COVID-19 vaccination programme. Some of the staff on the vaccination programme are ad-hoc, meaning they are poorly trained which would mean they may expose themselves to other diseases which out on field activities. This threat is **LOW**

### 1.7. FIRE EVENT.

The major area this threat can affect is the Ministry of Health building, where vaccination materials kept. The fire safety standard for the Ministry of health is low. Although the building has fire system installed, poorly fitted and exposed electrical fittings and exposed poorly stacked stores where vaccination materials are kept exposes the building to possible fire incident. This threat is rated as **MEDIUM**.

### 1.8. ENVIRONMENT (WEATHER).

The main environmental hazard in Ebonyi is flooding. The flooding can be very disruptive due to resulting road closures and traffic congestion. The IMPACT to staff is minor, putting the projected risk rating at **LOW**. If mitigating measures are implemented for the vaccination programme, this threat can be rated as NEGLIGIBLE Risk.

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## 1.9. PROGRAMMATIC.

Personnel involved in the vaccination programme have complained of low wages and poor support. Issues like strikes and demonstrations are common in Nigeria even for essential services like the health sector. Internal mechanisms to handle these threats are sadly not sufficient. This threat is rated as **MEDIUM**.

## 1.10. DEPLOYMENT.

There are a series of risks in this area from inadequate logistic support needed for the vaccine rollout to delays or non-payment of field staff allowances involved in the vaccination. There are also issues of support in terms of adequate PPE supply for frontline staff. This threat is rated as **MEDIUM** risk to the project.

## 1.11. POLITICAL.

Stakeholders in the project have identified some level of over politicisation of the vaccination programme as a threat. With the 2023 elections coming the year after, there is an increased threat of politicians politicizing the entire process which could further reduce the trust people already have in the vaccine. This threat is rated as **HIGH** risk.

## 1.12. CORRUPTION.

The threat of corruption in the vaccination programme is high especially with the exigency in which the first vaccination was initially carried out. Individuals may look to take advantage of the process to pilfer resource meant for the project. This threat is rated as **MEDIUM** Risk.

## 1.13. COMMUNICATION.

Communication and infrastructure were a threat to the vaccination programme, however, Ebonyi state has a good GSM network coverage throughout the state. Road network is a major challenge which can cause disruption of the vaccination process for hard-to-reach areas, but these issues can be dealt with proper preparation. This threat is rated as **LOW**.



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## 2. EVALUATION OF SECURITY RISKS.

### 2.1. INTRODUCTION.

In carrying out this risk assessment, a wide range of information sources have been used, including but not limited to:

- Feedback with programme and state government employees via an SRA checklist.
- Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO).
- US Department of State - Bureau of Consular Affairs.
- Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
- Open and closed commercial security sources available to Spearfish.
- Discussion and peer review within the Spearfish management team who collectively have a large amount of security and risk assessment experience.

In identifying the key risks, several factors were considered such as:

- The threat of terrorists targeting the vaccination programme.
- The threat of civil unrest in the proximity causing damage to the vaccination locations.
- The risk of natural disasters, particularly flooding and earthquake.
- Reputational, political, and financial risks to the donor and programmatic organisation.

The following section entitled Risk Description and Estimation will identify the risks that are considered relevant to this report. For a full description of the probability and impact scores, please refer to Annexes A and B.

### 2.2. RISK DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION.

#### 2.2.1. TERRORISM.

##### SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team or member of the public being killed or injured by a terrorist attack against the vaccination location itself or nearby targets including other building in use by the programme roll out.

##### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>(VBIED) Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device</b>	An attack using a parked or moving vehicle to deliver an explosive charge against the entrances or adjacent areas around the vaccination center, including lorry, car, motorized rickshaw or moped at any of the pedestrian entrances or the only vehicle entrance. This includes any congregations of people (i.e., queues at entrances).	This form of attack has never occurred in the state and is unlikely to be used by terror groups that operate in the state.

<b>(PBIED) Person Borne IED</b>	An attack using a person(s) to deliver an explosive charge(s) to an entrance area, lobby, or internal space, including internal spaces in use by the vaccination programme.	Identified terror groups in the state do not use this form of attack.
<b>Armed Attack</b>	An attack by single or teams of people using guns, IED's and grenades to injure or kill people at close quarters, either during the attack or by a delayed hostage scenario using the media to maximum effect	The IPOB and ESN groups have used this form of attack against both civilians and the government. In their enforcement of the recent sit-at-home protest, small armed groups paraded communities attacking people who did not comply with the directive.

**OVERALL RISK RATING:**

<b>Risk name</b>	<b>Probability</b>	<b>Impact</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>1 Terrorism</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>MEDIUM</b>

## 2.2.2. CRIME.

### SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being adversely affected by a criminal event such as a mugging, theft, extortion, or act of physical violence. Incidence of the vaccination location being targeted by organised criminal elements that has a serious impact on the programme delivery (theft of vaccine, equipment etc.) or reputation of the programme.

### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Armed Attack</b>	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team falls victim to a criminal act, either losing valuables or money, by mugging or pickpocketing or some other form of theft. An attack by single or teams of people, including OCGs, using guns to injure or kill people at close quarters. This is often associated with community invasion for looting rustling and kidnap.	Violent crime is common in the state and region. Personnel involved in the vaccination programme may be perceived as well off especially as they use items like tablets, cameras and other survey equipment thereby making them targets. collateral damage because of being in proximity to an attack have been reported by past vaccination teams in the state.
<b>Sexual Attack</b>	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team falling victim to a sexual assault by male predator(s) resulting in harassment, sexual disease, injury, or death.	Incidents of rape have been reported in popular nightlife areas, as well as in private homes. Do not travel alone at night.
<b>Organized Crime</b>	Infiltration of an organized criminal group into the vaccination programme, resulting in fraud, theft, loss of assets/funds, employment malpractice or general adverse publicity for both NCDC and the State Government if exposed.	There are criminal gangs operating in Ebonyi who may seek to exploit personnel involved in the vaccination programme by coercion, extortion, or black mail.
<b>Theft</b>	Theft of vaccine or equipment vital for delivery that negatively impacts ability to hit required quota. Smuggling of product out of programme or other illicit use of product that impacts programme at state level.	Recreational drug taking is widely practiced in some parts of Nigeria, so items like syringes and other medical items could be stolen. These items could also be resold as pharmaceutical products on the illegal market.
<b>Staff dishonesty</b>	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team engaging in dishonest conduct, such as theft from vaccination locations. Theft of assets, or fraud or embezzlement of funds from the programme itself.	Personnel involved in the vaccination programme could be compromised to resell items meant to be free or demand for payment before vaccination. Another forms of staff dishonesty are cases where staff produce inaccurate vaccination information to gain transport allowance or other reasons.
<b>Drug taking or smuggling</b>	Instance of drug taking within program premises for individual use, or the taking place of drug dealing either retail, i.e., to users, or wholesale, to other drug dealers. Use of methanol to enhance low grade alcohol resulting in death or injury of the imbiber	Recreational drug taking is widely practiced in some parts of the country. Locally recruited 'casual' staff will require appropriate security vetting during the employment process.

### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
<b>2 Crime</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>MEDIUM</b>

### 2.2.3. CIVIL UNREST.

#### SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being adversely affected by unrest caused by rioting, demonstrations, or political violence. Incidence of the vaccination location being targeted by organised criminal elements due to brand ownership of World Bank as an international donor. Any anti-vaccination movement targeting the programme in the form of local protests. Some communal clashes do occur regularly in Ebonyi between rural communities.

#### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Communal Clash/ Riot</b>	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being caught in a localized protest/riot outside or in vaccination location or other connected location e.g., office/laboratory facilities.	Events like the ENDSARS protests of 2020 that disrupted daily activities could occur in the state. The Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) called for a nationwide strike aimed at stopping Federal Government plans to increase pump price of fuel this year is an event that could threaten the vaccination programme.
<b>Demonstration</b>	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being caught in a demonstration either directed towards the vaccination programme, vaccination center or close by.	Demonstration by members of the vaccination programme have expressed their dissatisfaction at the current salary they are being paid and could decide to carry out demonstrations against the management. This could disrupt the vaccination and cause embarrassment.
<b>Political violence</b>	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being affected or injured by political violence associated by an election or local issue that is associated with the vaccination programme.	The political froth leading to next year's elections is likely to generate regular and sometimes violent protests. This could lead to the escalation of security measures with the associated application of lock-down measures in tempo with the rise in threat.

#### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
<b>3 Civil Unrest</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>MEDIUM</b>

## 2.2.4. TRAVEL RISK.

### SCOPE OF RISK:

Death from road traffic accident is high for those working in Nigeria. Although, according to the NBS – Q3, Ebonyi has one of the lowest RTA figures in the country, this does not mean the threat cannot affect staff during the vaccination process. The project does not have a crisis management

### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Road Traffic Accident (RTA)	Incidence of a programme vehicle being involved in a road traffic accident whilst effecting delivery of personnel or vaccine supplies to programme sites.	RTAs occur regularly due to poor roads, badly maintained vehicles, and poor driving skills. RTAs whilst over speeding often result in serious injuries or fatalities.
Vehicle Theft or Hijack	Incidence of a programme vehicle being stolen whilst parked and unattended, or actively hijacked from programme personnel following and encountering an IVCP.	Opportunity vehicle theft can occur if vehicles have insufficient security out of hours. Vehicle hijack is a possibility but often vehicles are abandoned, and the personnel are kidnapped. IVCPs can occur anywhere but are very prevalent in the regions where terrorists and OCGs are operating.
Boat Accident	Incidence of a boat accident where programme activities require the movement of personnel and stores by water.	Boat accidents occur where poor safety measures are followed – overloading, over speeding and failure to wear life jackets.

### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
4 Road Traffic Accident	2	2	LOW

## 2.2.5. KIDNAP.

### SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team being kidnapped either on or off work. Staff of the project could be perceived to be well to do or they may intend to get ransom from the project or government.

### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Ideological kidnap</b>	Terror groups may kidnap staff of the project to pressure the government accept their demands. This is common in the northeast part of the country with insurgent groups like Boko Haram. The kidnap and detention of a programme member of staff to achieve political aims.	These attacks are not usually motivated by financial reasons but intend to force government decisions in their favor. The threat of this tactic exists in Ebonyi is possible but has not been used.
<b>Kidnap for Ransom</b>	Staff of the project could be kidnapped for economic reasons i.e., to collect ransom	Kidnap for ransom remains an enduring risk across the country, driven by the disparity in wealth and lack of employment prospects. Kidnaps are often conducted by OCGs. The past decade has seen a surge in kidnappings in the Southeastern regions. However, the risk is pervasive across the entire country. A country wide vaccination programme will necessarily need constant and effective media marketing. This will bring the programme to the attention of OCGs, potentially increasing risk.
<b>Express Kidnap (One Chance)</b>	The short-term kidnap of a programme member of staff to force the removal of available cash from ATMs.	Express kidnap is particularly prevalent where there is wealth and a high frequency of ATMs, as found in the commercial centers of major cities, towns, and suburb hubs.

### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
<b>4 Kidnap</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>MEDIUM</b>

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## 2.2.6. MEDICAL EMERGENCY.

### SCOPE OF RISK:

With staff working in the vaccination programme are more exposed than the average person. This makes the risk of infection to COVID-19 or other diseases. The contraction of disease, sickness, or workplace accident of such severity as to need an emergency response and temporary or long-term hospitalization of a staff member.

### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Disease</b>	Incidence of a member of staff contracting an endemic disease because of their programme delivery and/or interaction with target stakeholders, causing them to be unable to work or requiring their hospitalisation/isolation.	Although there are many endemic diseases in the country, it is anticipated that the nature of the work will engender an exceedingly elevated level of personal and programme sanitation. Such SOPs will significantly reduce the risk.
<b>Sickness</b>	Incidence of sickness due to personal physiology or due to the ingestion of a sick bug, causing them to be unable to work.	Despite programme and personal sanitary drills, people regularly fall ill due to chronic conditions or food poisoning. This is a perennial risk for all.
<b>Accident</b>	Incidence of a work-related accident during programme delivery which is of such severity that they are temporarily or permanently unable to continue their duties.	Accidents regularly occur in work environments and particularly where there are high numbers of people. The risk of serious accidents will be reduced by proper planning, rehearsals, and strict adherence to safety SOPs.

### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
<b>Medical Emergency</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>LOW</b>

## 2.2.7. FIRE EVENT.

### SCOPE OF RISK:

Fire incidents could occur within project facilities, thereby damaging equipment, or harming personnel.

### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Fire Event	The collateral involvement in a fire event causing damage or destruction of programme facilities, equipment, or personnel due to the dense and chaotic nature of the urban landscape.	Fire incident could occur in project facilities. Poor firefighting equipment in project offices made the threat possible. Fire is a particular risk in the vicinity of urban market areas, slums, and other zones where illegal and haphazard building has been allowed to occur. This risk is elevated in certain parts of the major towns and cities.
Arson	The malicious use of fire to cause the damage or destruction of programme facilities, equipment, or personnel.	Project facilities could be set on fire by saboteurs for assorted reasons. This incident is unlikely to occur. Arson is often used by ex-staff members who bear a grudge, due to being sacked or failing to obtain employment. Arson is also used as a tool to raise tensions by political agitators. In certain parts of the country the political and community dynamics may elevate arson as a risk to the programme.

### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
4 Fire Event	3	3	<b>MEDIUM</b>



## 2.2.8. ENVIRONMENTAL – NATURAL CATASTROPHES (WEATHER).

### SCOPE OF RISK:

Severe weather could disrupt vaccination activities through flooding, land slide, infrastructural destruction, heat wave, and so on.

### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
High Wind	Incidence of a programme member of staff being killed or injured, or the damage or destruction of programme assets, due to exceedingly high wind gusts.	The risk is not necessarily from the wind itself but from projectiles picked up and accelerated by the force of the wind. This is an occasional, usually very short-term risk during the rainy season.
Lightning	Incidence of a programme member of staff being killed or injured because of lightning.	A high incidence of lightning is common in the vicinity of tropical storms during the rainy season. Tropical storms are more frequent and occur over the greatest part of the year in the south of the country.
Floods	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being killed or injured during floods caused by heavy rain. Damage or destruction to the vaccination center or surrounding areas by flooding.	Tropical storms can generate exceedingly high volumes of localized rainfall in short periods of time. In cities, flooding can quickly occur due to poor sanitation resulting in drain blockage. In rural areas, flash flooding can occur in low lying areas whilst sheet floods can wash away roads across flat areas in the North. Although there is risk, this should be countered with proper planning and coordination.

### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
Environmental	2	2	LOW

## 2.2.9. PROGRAMMATIC.

### SCOPE OF RISK:

Internal programme management issues either in the management of personnel or resource. Issues like industrial action is an example of this. A failure to thoughtfully plan delivery sequencing, inform stakeholders and train programme staff in advance of project start, risks unexpected issues which will delay, alarm, and potentially cause the failure of the programme.

### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Covid protocols</b>	A failure to insist on strict Covid protocols at vaccination centres causes these same centres to become Covid super spreader fulcrums.	The pre-roll out communication exercise needs to fully inform stakeholders of the protocol requirements to be applied to enter a vaccination clinic and inform stakeholders of the queueing protocols once admitted to sites. Failure to adhere to advertised protocols risks further spread of Covid.
<b>ID capture</b>	A failure to capture reliable information on the numbers being vaccinated progressively throughout the programme results in doubts as to data efficacy and a loss of confidence in the process.	Poor pre-roll out communication risks stakeholders being unable to provide ID on arrival at vaccination centres. Any IT based data capture system risks interruption due to power loss and will need to be rugged to operate in the field.
<b>SF discord with Civilian population</b>	Incidence of elements of the supporting security force generating tension due to their discord with the local community.	In certain areas the security forces have a very fractious relationship with the local community and are looked on with fear and suspicion.

### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
<b>Programmatic</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>MEDIUM</b>

## 2.2.10. DEPLOYMENT

### SCOPE OF RISK:

Logistic or distribution issues that could hinder the vaccination programme either through lack of vehicles, use of the right vehicles 4x4 vehicles to hard-to-reach areas, vehicle share with other projects that could affect the flexibility of the programme or just lacking professionally trained drivers to carryout field activities. Deployment can be in form of not having sufficient gear or personnel for field activities. Operational and logistical aspects of the programme roll out face risk interruption to vaccine delivery to field sites and, potentially, risk to vaccine efficacy if vaccine storage temperatures cannot be maintained. In certain areas, distance and poor road conditions could impact on staff deployments and vaccine center opening/closing times.

### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Distribution Disruption</b>	Poor logistical management causing interruption of vaccine supply to the field, leading to delays in the overall programme	Poor coordination of transport and supplies will cause delays in delivery. Security challenges could trigger decision points within the security framework which cause temporary or permanent cessation of programme delivery in specific areas. These challenges will be present in remote areas and in the many regions of heightened security threat.
<b>Power Interruption</b>	Incidence of power interruption leading to write off vaccine stock due to heat damage. (According to brand, Covid 19 vaccines must be stored within a narrow temperature range).	Unless mitigations are put in place at each delivery point for the duration of the vaccination exercise, the risk of vaccine damage due to power loss is a perennial one across the country.
<b>Unexpected vaccination window extension</b>	Incidence of interruption to the smooth deployment of stock and medical delivery of vaccinations leading to unplanned extension of the delivery time.	Unplanned time extensions to programme delivery risk disruption elsewhere in the programme and potentially increase risk to staff due to extended presence in high-risk areas.

### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
<b>6 Deployment</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>MEDIUM</b>

## 2.2.11. POLITICAL.

### SCOPE OF RISK:

The concurrent acceleration of political campaigns in the lead up to the 2023 elections could impinge, tangentially or directly, on the programme's ability to deliver effectively. In certain areas of the country the government's authority and control is challenged (IPOB's 'Biafraland' in the South-East). In these areas there is increased security risk which will challenge the programme's ability to access areas and deliver vaccines. Elevated levels of interference or highjack of the vaccination process by individuals or parties for the sake of popularity. Politicians may want to take credit for the vaccination process by holding political rallies on vaccination days aimed at benefiting from the sensitization process or by openly taking credit for organising the vaccination itself.

### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Elections</b>	Concurrent political campaigns causing dilution to programme communications or directly impacting the effectiveness of the vaccine delivery programme.	With the 2023 Nigerian elections about a year away, political parties and individuals will make effort to benefit from the vaccination programme which may increase the profile of the project to anti-government groups like IPOB or ESN. Also, Funds or support could be withheld to pressure personnel within the vaccination programme to identify with them or work within political process.
<b>Traditional Rulers and other traditional institutions</b>	Failure to apply the correct notification protocols in the lead up to vaccine delivery causing a snub to the traditional ruler in that area. A withdrawal of royal or religious approval could result in a loss of buy in by the local community.	Local cultural protocols are an important part of community life. A failure to both understand and follow the correct procedures could result in an extremely poor turn out at vaccine centers.
<b>Contested Areas</b>	Incidence of restricted access. Programme delivery might not be possible in certain parts of the country where the legitimate government's authority is being challenged.	Some LGA's could pose additional security risks that will require additional planning and security mitigation. Even then, there is a risk that some areas might have to be declared 'no-go.'

### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
<b>7 Political</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>HIGH</b>

## 2.2.12. CORRUPTION.

### SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of corruption impacting the programme. Unfortunately, corruption is a pervasive and accepted part of daily business up, down and across government institutions in the country. This culture allows fraud and embezzlement to take place with almost total impunity. Dishonest or fraudulent conduct by personnel in authority, typically involving bribery. This is seen in processes like recruitment, allocation of resources, nepotism, favouritism, diversion of materials, tribalism or siphoning of funds.

### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Staff Dishonesty	A member of staff engaging in dishonest conduct, such as fraud or embezzlement of funds from the programme itself.	Fraud or embezzlement of funds could rapidly sap the tempo and vigor of the vaccine programme roll out, resulting in failure to vaccinate large parts of the population.
Extortion	Extraction of resources from the programme by a staff member because they have been placed under duress by a third party.	Locally recruited programme staff could be placed in this situation by criminal elements within the local community.
Bribery	Incentivization of programme staff to disrupt or cause the failure of the vaccine programme.	Politically motivated agents could seek to disrupt the programme to make the incumbent government (federal, state, or local) look weak and disorganized.

### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
8 Corruption	3	2	<b>MEDIUM</b>

## 2.2.13. COMMUNICATION.

### SCOPE OF RISK:

Poor sensitization about the need to take vaccine. Damage or destruction to areas of the hotel, such as landscaping, fixtures and fittings or hotel interior areas and rooms themselves.


### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Sensitization</b>	Poor communication and lack of timely programme advertising resulting in low take up of the vaccine amongst communities	A weak and poorly structured communication campaign risks failure to properly notify every one of the programmes timings and intent.
<b>Coordination</b>	Failure to coordinate attendance scheduling, resulting in excessive queues with long waiting times, generating dissent and potential civil unrest.	Poor notification of attendance schedules poses a risk of excessive numbers and crowd management challenges at vaccine delivery sites.
<b>False News</b>	Incidence of social media challenges as to the efficacy of the vaccines versus traditional medicines, generating doubt and leading to low turnout at vaccine centers.	The use of social media to sow false information is a recognized problem in countries which already have high vaccine take-up.
<b>Counter Narratives</b>	Incidence of anti-establishment commentary suggesting that the vaccine programme is a government plot to infect the population with unknown chemicals, resulting in stakeholder refusal to be vaccinated.	The use of social media to plant doubt and fear in the minds of the population is a recognized problem in countries which already have high vaccine take up.

### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
<b>8 Communication</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>MEDIUM</b>

### 3. ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED SECURITY RISKS (EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL).



Threat Scenario	Impact	Probability	Risk
1	2.8 Moderate	3.2 Likely	Medium
2	3 Moderate	3.4 Likely	Medium
3	3.2 Moderate	3.3 Likely	Medium
4	3.3 Moderate	2.6 Likely	Medium
5	3.2 Moderate	2.6 Likely	Medium
6	3.4 Moderate	2.3 Possible	Low
7	3.6 Severe	2.4 Possible	Medium
8	2.5 Minor	3.3 Likely	Low
9	2.4 Minor	3.6 Highly Likely	Medium
10	3 Moderate	2.8 Likely	Medium
11	4 Severe	3.5 Likely	High
12	3 Moderate	3.4 Likely	Medium
13	3.6 Severe	3.2 Likely	High

The major threat in the matrix is the Political risk which is high. This is due to the coming 2022 election and the possibility of it affecting the vaccination process adversely. This factor alone could affect other factors like civil unrest, kidnap, corruption, and terrorism. Politics in Nigeria bring with it a lot of issues like political manipulations and increased violence from political opponents. Government may also get involved in the vaccination process to make political gains.

Civil Unrest risk can be significant, and this threat is likely to increase as one goes closer to 2023 when Nigeria will be having its general election. Ebonyi experiences a lot of communal clashes usually along ethnic lines, however, the election will increase friction along political lines and more widespread. In communities like Oruku, Ikpo and Onisha LGA, there have been steady clashes within these communities, and these are likely to become worse as the elections draw closer.

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Elevated levels of poverty, unemployment and a general disenchantment with the cards that have been dealt, can often result in inter-community friction (be that agro-pastoral or inter-tribal), gang/cult turf wars, and an exceptionally low trigger threshold to spark off protest, mass unrest or riot.

Vaccination staff in the state say there is a general mistrust for security personnel which is based on both historical Biafra civil war era views and recent government security crackdown on Biafra separatists in the region which have led to some collateral casualties among the population. Heavy handedness of security personnel like the police and military have further reinforced this mistrust among local people.

A recent report by civil organisation published a report that claimed that the Government Security Agencies like police, military, air force, DSS, and navy have killed about 1,400, 1,000 missing, 4,800 arrested south easterners since October 2020. This is one of several similar news that has increased the level of mistrust for security personnel that exist in the southeast. Vaccination personnel openly claim that there is a visible difference in numbers between when they would go out to the field with security escorts and when they travelled without them.

NSCDC officers say they were trained on ways to COVID-19 vaccination in late 2021, however, a limited number of officers participated in this training. A follow-up training should be organised and no NSCDC staff that did not take part in the training should participate in vaccination support missions. The short 30-day lifespan of the Modena vaccine significantly compounds the workforce and logistic issues.

Ebonyi office report of a workforce shortage. This is evident in the last COVID-19 vaccination exercise where teams had to work long hours to cover the state. The rapid response team also struggled to respond to cases. A shortage of vehicles was also a major issue for the state especially to hard-to-reach locations. The state further pointed out that support they got from the local government offices throughout the state may not be there in the next vaccination exercise because the local government staff did not receive any remunerations which impacted on their motivation to want to do the job in the future.

The IPOB and BSN has considerable influence among peoples of the southeast. This influence is steeped in fear of violence from these groups. Sit-at-home orders by the groups are enforced through violence. Although the groups have been indifferent to the vaccination except when there are direct interactions between these groups and security personnel in the company of the vaccination teams like what happened in Anambra during an outreach programme in Awka. This should be kept in mind during vaccination programmes.



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## 4. RISK MITIGATION MEASURES & PLAN.

### 4.1. INTRODUCTION.

A multi-layered approach to security is effective as it can mitigate risks using generic principles. This section will propose several risk controls for approval by the NCDC programme team and State Government to address the risks identified above. As discussed initially, they will be written as objective statements, i.e., the desired state that is to be achieved, not how to achieve it. As shown below, each control's predicted reduction on its risk will be documented. This will then form the basis for the Security Management Framework, which will be written after this risk assessment has been accepted and signed off by the client.

### 4.2. INDIVIDUAL RISK MITIGATIONS.

#### 4.2.1. TERRORISM.

##### **RISK CONTROLS:**

- State Security Manager will issue advisories on any areas where specific threat is expected based on liaison with local authorities.
- It is clearly impractical staff to avoid all public places, places of worship etc but duty of care suggests informing them of targets as part of security awareness training.
- Avoidance of pattern setting (times, routes, locations, and vehicle/personnel profiles) is to be actively managed by project security focal point.
- Information assurance ('need to know') procedures to be implemented.
- Organisation should avoid media actions that could make them targets of terror groups like media statements, publications etc.
- Management team to actively monitor all personnel, especially those on field work outside the office.
- Identify potential Safe Haven locations in event of a series of attacks making movement difficult.
- Identify potential evacuation routes in the event of a terrorist attack on specific venues.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new Probability and Impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
1 Terrorism	2	2	LOW

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#### 4.2.2. CRIME.

##### RISK CONTROLS:

- Staff advised to always maintain a low profile.
- State Security Manager to track criminal trends and events and notify Project teams of any significant issues that could affect the project
- Security awareness training to include avoidance of pattern setting information security and management of personal profile.
- Drivers are instructed not to travel in the early morning before 6:30am and after 5:30pm
- Drivers to be security awareness trained
- High value movements (cash or vaccine equipment) to be planned in coordination with security adviser
- For long distance travel staff are advised to travel in a 2-car convoy with the chase vehicle carrying passengers or vaccine material.
- Hotels and extended stay accommodation are audited and approved by security adviser
- Staff are advised on how to improve site security at their individual residences and can seek personal advice from security advisor.
- Emergency response procedure through a local CMT to handle incidents on a case-by-case basis.
- Security Hotline is an immediate response point of contact in an incident.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new Probability and Impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
2 Crime	2	3	LOW

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### 4.2.3. CIVIL UNREST.

#### RISK CONTROLS:

- A rapid response security team should be setup and ready to respond to security issues affecting the vaccination teams.
- During election periods work in the state is suspended or reduced as much as possible in the state.
- Security personnel working with the project at any point must have been briefed and understand on the ESS 4, page 48 of the World Bank ESF. All rules of engagement must be based on these standards. Issues like unrest, crime, and other physical threats must adhere to these rules. These training should be led by the State Security Manager.
- Security adviser to issue advisories to all personnel including drivers of areas to avoid based on liaison with local authorities.
- Security adviser to check all proposed routes avoid areas of potential unrest
- staff to be advised must not participate in protests or demonstrations.
- CMT to include immediate action on civil unrest situation developing
- Identify potential Safe Haven locations in event of widespread unrest in the city
- Identify potential evacuation routes in the event of protracted unrest in Ebonyi.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new Probability and Impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
3 Civil Unrest	2	2	LOW

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#### 4.2.4. TRAVEL RISK.

##### RISK CONTROLS:

- Sufficient vehicles should be provided to vaccination teams.
- A proper journey management system should be established for the vaccination teams that involve proper planning, monitoring and response to incident. This should be managed by the State Security Manager.
- Drivers should go through a defensive driver training programme.
- Enforce speed limits through vehicle tracking.
- Driver selection and training based on Ebonyi experience.
- Person responsible to assess rental cars before hire and report as fit for purpose.
- Person responsible to conduct regular (at least monthly) vehicles checks including spare parts and medical equipment.
- Limit driving hours to reduce fatigue and stress among the drivers. It is noted this is difficult to enforce but it is a serious cause of RTA, and the issue cannot be ignored.
- Night travels is not allowed.
- Nearest Hospitals and Ambulance services MUST be identified by the State Security Manager.
- Contact lists for physicians within the medical facilities need to be established by State Security Manager.
- Remote location **Med Evac** plans should be understood by all travellers.
- Staff should be trained in first response first aid.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
5 Indirect attacks	1	2	NEGLIGIBLE

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#### 4.2.5. KIDNAP.

##### RISK CONTROLS:

- Security adviser to disseminate any new kidnap specific advice from Spearfish sources or other agencies as a priority (UNDSS/FCO/OSAC/ASIS/GTR) as well as government security agencies (GSA).
- Kidnap awareness to be included in induction training including varying routes to work and social locations, information security, reducing profile to kidnapers.
- staff are advised to maintain a low profile always during security briefings.
- Staff should not set patterns or routines as much as possible.
- Hired vehicles should be briefed on kidnap prevention.
- K & R training and preparedness for all staff should be done at least once a year.
- Travel itinerary is kept confidential and shared on a need-to-know basis.
- Person responsible for journey management to enforce proper management of staff movement in the field.
- Staff Tracking and Journey Management guidelines.
- K & R setup like Proof of Life should be done for staff.
- K & R insurance policy and requirements to be reviewed and advised by organisation's Management.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
6 Trespass	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

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#### 4.2.6. MEDICAL EMERGENCY.

##### RISK CONTROLS:

- Awareness training for long term visitors (especially any living outside hotels) on measures to prevent mosquito bites, including the use of high-concentration insect repellent, COVID 19 PPE (Personal Protective Equipment), protective clothing, and netting at night.
- Organisation's office should be spaced out in line with COVID 19 protocol.
- All field staff should have an Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) and trained on its use.
- Security adviser to issue advisory on COVID 19 safety in Ebonyi.
- Security adviser to issue advisories based on emerging health risks as well as COVID 19 infection numbers.
- Medical insurance cover must be adequate for private health clinics and medical evacuation.
- CMT to cover medical emergency as well as response plan in the event of an emergency like COVID 19.
- Signages and information should be displayed throughout the office environment both for visitors and staff on COVID 19 prevention and response numbers.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
6 Trespass	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

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#### 4.2.7. FIRE EVENT.

##### RISK CONTROLS:

- Hotels are assessed by security adviser for the best fire safety standards.
- Staff are trained during security briefing on procedures and responses during fire emergencies.
- Electricity panels should be properly labelled and secured.
- Organisation's storage rooms must be adequate.
- Main and alternate muster points identified for evacuating building.
- Fire warden to ensure personnel list available to account for all personnel at office.
- Emergency response plan for fire at all locations to be briefed to new personnel by fire warden.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
7 Hostile surveillance	2	2	LOW

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#### 4.2.8. ENVIRONMENTAL (WEATHER).

##### RISK CONTROLS:

- Security adviser ensures that the hotels staff stay in are not located in flood areas.
- Proper 4x4 vehicles should be provided to the field teams that can handle the terrain during severe weather.
- Project staff must also understand and adhere to the World Bank Environment and Community Health and Safety standards (ESS4).
- Warning is also issued by the security adviser to leave out time before appointments to avoid being caught up in traffic due to flooding.
- CMT can be formed in the event staff are trapped in areas of the city due to flooding.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
8 Vandalism	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE



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#### 4.2.9. PROGRAMMATIC.

##### RISK CONTROLS:

- Mechanism to deal with staff unrest within the programme should be developed and strengthened. Issues like misconduct and discipline should be handled in an open and transparent manner.
- Staff salaries should be paid on time especially field staff. Local government staff involved in the vaccination process should be handed remuneration to encourage them to participate in the future.
- Project staff should be briefed on World Bank health and safety standards contained in World Bank Environment and Social Framework handbook.
- Regular stakeholder engagement should be arranged regularly and local groups like traditional rulers, local Juju/Sharmen, youth groups, women groups, local unions, and prominent individuals should be included.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
8 Vandalism	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

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#### 4.2.10. DEPLOYMENT.

##### RISK CONTROLS:

- Adequate vehicles should be provided to vaccination teams. The teams currently share with other programmes and agencies which has slowed the vaccination process in the state.
- The National Orientation Agency (NOA) should be involved in the vaccination drive. The agency should be actively involved in dispelling fake news about the virus.
- Local Juju/Sharmen in local communities should be carried along in the campaign for the vaccination even if they are provided with incentives.
- The programme should have a close relationship with security personnel like the police to get security information before deployment. Areas where there may be conflict in the state should be avoided completely.
- A proper journey management process should be established
- Staff should be briefed on security response to incidents while in the field.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
8 Vandalism	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

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#### 4.2.11. POLITICAL.

##### RISK CONTROLS:

- In Ebonyi, the government have been actively involved in the vaccination process, however, health workers should take the lead in radio, TV, and other media platforms to increase trust by the people.
- Due to the coming 2023 elections, the vaccination programme should be done earlier than later. This is important because the closer the programme gets to the coming election the bigger the possibility of politics taking advantage of the vaccination platform.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
8 Vandalism	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

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#### 4.2.12. CORRUPTION.

##### RISK CONTROLS:

- Anti-corruption agencies like EFCC and ICPC should be actively involved at some stage in the monitoring of programme funds and use.
- Internal conduct mechanisms like due process should be strengthened and transparent to ensure funds and processes are not tampered with.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
8 Vandalism	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

---

#### 4.2.13. COMMUNICATION.

##### RISK CONTROLS:

- The National Orientation Agency (NOA) should be part of the sensitization campaign for the vaccination process. Regular radio, TV and social media programmes should be carried out to debunk misunderstandings or false news about the vaccination.
- Alternative means of communication like the use of Sat Phones should be procured and given to field staff. Although Ebonyi has an effective communication system, alternative ones should be in place to ensure a smooth uninterrupted process.
- Extra data sources should be provided for field staff that may require transmission of data while in the field. Having more than one internet network is an avenue.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
8 Vandalism	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

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## 5. PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR MANAGING RISKS.

### 5.1. Training

- Staff and security agency **induction training on SOPs and ERPs** regularly organised by the State Security Manager should be a requirement for field work. This is the same as in item 5 above.
- All programme and security agency personnel to be briefed on the **delivery framework and RoE**
- Vaccination team training and rehearsals.

### 5.2. Drills

- **Background vetting** process should be setup for all recruitment exercise. The State Security Manager should be involved in this process.
- Covid-19 site protocol.

### 5.3. Equipment

- A **dedicated transport fleet** should be created with vehicles suitable for field work.
- Vehicle trackers should be installed on all project vehicles.
- A **robust IT system and plan** for data capture.
- A **Robust cold chain containers** with appropriate time specifications for temperature retention.
- **PPE provision** (PHC sanitisation, masks, disinfectants, signage).
- Staff ID badges - a risk?
- Dual SIM phones.
- Sat phones.

### 5.4. Communication


- **WhatsApp Alert groups** should be formed where security information can be disseminated to staff quickly. This can be managed by the State Security Manager
- **'Constant Companion Card'** this is a contacts card with relevant project contacts that all staff should have.
- A **Rules of Engagement Card** (RoE) should be made available to security personnel.

### 5.5. Security Advisory Unit

- Set up a **Security Advisory Team** in Abuja and led at state level by a **State Security Manager** that will oversee all security issues that include Travel Security, Security Training, and lead crisis response. He will be a member of the COVID-19 Security Group and will ensure cross cooperation between the different security groups like the Police, Civil Defence, Military, Road Safety, DSS, Navy and Air force. He will also coordinate relationship with local community stakeholders.
- **Security Hotline** that will be owned by the State Security Adviser that is active 24 hours a day. This hotline will be different from the COVID-19 response line.

- 
- Creating a **Crisis Management Team** consisting of mid-rank representatives the deferent security groups. This team will ensure compliance of their personnel to Project guidelines stated in the IFC Performance Standard 4 paragraph 12 and other procedures.
  - A **COVID-19 Adverse Reaction Unit** should also be formed, or existing units repurposed to respond people who experience adverse reaction to the vaccine. This unit should have representatives at every ward in each local government, so people do not need to pay for adverse reaction to the vaccine.

## 6. SUMMARY OF SECURITY FINDINGS.



Threat Scenario		Impact	Probability	Risk
1	Terrorism	2 Minor	2 Possible	Low
2	Crime	3 Moderate	2 Possible	Low
3	Civil Unrest	2 Minor	2 Possible	Low
4	Travel risk	1 Negligible	2 Possible	Negligible
5	Kidnap	1 Negligible	2 Possible	Negligible
6	Medical Emergency	1 Negligible	2 Possible	Negligible
7	Fire Event	2 Minor	2 Possible	Low
8	Environmental (Weather)	1 Negligible	2 Possible	Negligible
9	Programmatic	1 Negligible	2 Possible	Negligible
10	Deployment	1 Negligible	2 Possible	Negligible
11	Political	1 Negligible	2 Possible	Negligible
12	Corruption	1 Negligible	2 Possible	Negligible
13	Communication	1 Negligible	2 Possible	Negligible

The above risk maps are a means of demonstrating the intended reduction in risk, using the proposed controls. The intention is to be able to use these controls to build the Security Management Framework, Emergency Response Plans and the appropriate staff and security training regimen and to accept the residual level of risk left in place. These controls do not guarantee such incidents will not happen, but they reduce the chances of one happening. If one occurs, the impact is minimised, and the chances of recovery are maximised.

The above controls can be grouped into the following broad categories, which will become the basic components of the deployment process and vaccination site mitigations by priority:

- Deployment and Recovery
- Physical barriers and structures, including lighting and other recommend works.
- Access Control – using checkpoints and registration points.



- 
- Covid-19 protocols and PPE availability
  - Cold Chain Management
  - CoPREP/Security agency protocols and RoE

Security procedures, training standards and contingency plans are key parts of the overall security management. An integrated security solution using people, technology and procedures involves all three aspects, and each must be carefully coordinated with the other two to produce a seamless security environment.

This risk assessment identifies the priority risks and provides a framework against which we identify the current security shortfalls and prioritise the recommended work to mitigate the gaps.