SECURITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

PART 3

COPREP

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

The Security Management Framework is a guidance document for the future stages of the COVID-19 vaccination programme in Nigeria. An initial Security Risk Assessment was carried out in six states within the six geo-political zones in Nigeria to identify threats and challenges to the COVID-19 vaccination programme. An analysis of both unique and common threats was carried out to further develop mitigative measures against these threats. The Framework provides a model on which the state vaccination programmes can develop its own security plan to operate effectively by the safest means, based on best practice.

The project requires a structured security architecture, dedicated to ensuring compliance to World Bank standards and practices, which protects personnel, the people being vaccinated and the environment. Specifically, the security team, when in place, will be responsible for ensuring appropriate and uniform standards of training, as well as providing subsequent compliance oversight of supporting security agencies' delivery standards. The SMF also gives mitigation guidance on the infrastructure and logistic challenges that have slowed the previous COVID-19 vaccine rollout, as well as strategies to overcome issues of acceptance of the vaccine by unenlightened Nigerians.

The risk assessments were conducted in a professional manner, to a set standard, regardless of the lack of engagement from some quarters. It is CoPREP's intent that the recommendations contained in this Framework be taken up by state teams, thereby leading to an efficient and effective COVID-19 vaccination roll out.

Advice given and recommendations made do not constitute a warranty of future results or an assurance against risk. No express or implied warranty is given in respect of any judgment made or to any changes or unforeseen escalation of any factors affecting any such judgment. Reports are intended for the project only but may be disclosed to other group companies and third-party companies with a direct connection to the subject. Any further distribution may not take place without the prior written consent of Nigeria CoPREP.

1. INTRODUCTION.

1.1. APPROACH.

The Nigerian Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), via the Covid-19 Preparedness and Response Project (CoPREP), will utilise the services of respective State Ministries of Health and Primary Health Care services for the intra-state delivery of the Covid-19 vaccination programme.

In most instances, the level of localised security risk will necessitate the cooperation and assistance of appropriate state security agencies to enable the vaccination programme to be delivered.

According to the level of threat, this assistance may be from the Army, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) or the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), although according to need, state might also seek assistance from any of the state level security arrangements such as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), the Western Nigeria Security Network (WNSN – 'Amotekun'), *Ebube Agwu* and *Yan Sakai.*

In order to ensure the successful delivery of the programme within a sometimes-challenging security envelope, it is necessary to work to a recognised security management framework which ensures the safety of all stakeholders yet holds the key security organisations to rules of engagement and performance which comply with the World Bank's performance standards.

1.2. PURPOSE OF SECURITY MANAGEMENT.

The purpose of this document is to give guidance to state programme managers on the risk assessment and security plan development process so that state teams can each develop their security plans based on common principles. Furthermore, this document defines the boundaries of security management to be delivered by a security agency when in support of the vaccination programme, as defined in the respective MoU between the security agency and the Vaccination programme provider. These guidelines will act as a baseline framework for safe programme delivery, whether the programme is delivering in, FCT, Borno State or Bayelsa State.

Good practice regarding the use of security forces is based on the concept that providing security and respecting human rights can and should be consistent. This translates into implementation of policies and practices that ensure security provision is carried out responsibly, with any response being proportional to the threat. Proactive communication, community engagement, and grievance redress are central to this approach, often through collaboration between security and community relations departments. Gender considerations are also important, as women often have different experiences and interactions with security personnel.

1.3. POLICIES AND STANDARDS.

The vaccine programme will be compliant with the Federal Ministry of Health's (FMoH) 'Nigeria Vaccine Policy', published in Sep 2021.

The Nigerian Armed forces, the Police and the various paramilitary organisations all have their roles, responsibilities and boundaries defined under law. However, the different organisations vary considerably in the limits to their powers and responsibilities. It is therefore vital that, whichever security agency is selected to assist in a state's vaccination programme, all the security stakeholders understand, and are compliant with, the standards and boundaries expected, specifically in relation to their function as security providers for the programme.

This guidance is given by this framework document, the Rules of Engagement. (Annex G), and the Memorandum of Understanding (Annex H).

2. SITUATION OVERVIEW.

2.1. POLITICAL SITUATION.

Following decades of military rule, Nigeria has been a multiparty democracy since 1999. It has a bicameral legislature comprising a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. Political parties alternate their candidates for elected office on an 'ethnoregional' basis, also referred to as the Federal Quota System. This system has polarised regional politics with the result that elections often serve as flashpoints for violence.

2.2. 2023 ELECTIONS.

Presidential and legislative elections were last held in early 2019. President Muhammadu Buhari was re-elected, and the All-Progressives Congress (APC) regained its legislative majority, holding 217 national assembly seats, 64 senate seats and 19 of 36 state governors. President Buhari completes his second tenure in 2023 and political manoeuvering has already become a regular topic of discussion, both in the media and among Nigerians.

2.3. SECURITY CHALLENGES.

The specifics of each security threat in relation to the geopolitical zones are covered in Part 2 – SRA's. Nigeria's long-standing security challenges include:

- Militant Islamists, predominantly active in the North-East Region but with indications that they are moving into north-western states.

- Violence related to Organised Criminal Gangs (OCGs), commonly referred to as bandits, and criminal violence in the NW and NC Regions.

- Street gangs and Organised Criminal Gangs (OCGs) in the South-West Region.

- Conflict between farmers and herders, historically in the North-West and Middle Belt, but increasingly occurring in southern states.

- Communal and ethnic clashes in the North-Central Region and increasingly in the southern states.

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- Biafra separatists in the South-East and Delta Region.

- Oil militancy and piracy in southern Nigeria, particularly the Niger Delta.

- Election-related violence, with the next elections just over a year away.

- Pan-national use of kidnap as a business model.

2.4. COPREP VACCINATION PROGRAMME CONTEXT.

Vaccination programme governance is central to the work of NCDC because of the critical involvement of stakeholders which might include Civil society Organisations (CSOs), community organisations, youth organisations, women's organisations, organizations of persons living with disability and faith-based organisations that perform sundry functions, particularly mobilisation and education, in the awareness and sensitisation process. Selected security agencies are key to smooth operations and risk management and the media plays a prominent role in the overall process. Finally, stakeholders increasingly include international development partners, bilateral and multilateral agencies that provide technical and financial support to the immunisation process. The functions of these stakeholders include:

- Mobilisation of citizens to participate by attending, registering and taking the vaccine.

- Oversight of the vaccination process.

- Support for the process through working with the Value Monitoring and Benchmarking (VMB) organisations.

- Spreading certain ethical values and expectations that are supportive of the vaccine delivery process.

- Information dissemination.

- Gate keeping functions.

- Rule-setting and norm-setting.

- Conflict management.

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3. SECURITY AGENCIES.

3.1. INTRODUCTION.

The regulatory environment for security agencies assisting in the implementation of the programme is given below. For each option, risks, background checks, training and Rules of Engagement (ROE) are explained.

This guidance is based on the WB's ESS4 guidelines which require:

- That government security personnel deployed to provide security services act in a proper manner and used only for preventive and defensive purposes in proportion to the nature and extent of the threat and that security arrangements for the vaccination programme be disclosed to the public, subject to overriding security concerns;

- That the nominated security agencies are vetted to ensure they are not implicated in past abuses; (ii) trained adequately (or determine that they are properly trained) in the use of force (and where applicable, firearms) and appropriate conduct toward workers and affected communities; and (iii) and act within the applicable law and any requirements set out in the Environmental and Social Commitment (ESCP).

- That allegations of unlawful or abusive acts by security personnel are fully investigated and appropriate action taken to prevent recurrence and, where necessary, report unlawful and abusive acts to the relevant authorities.

3.2. REGULATORY POLICY FOR PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES IN NIGERIA.

The PGC Act No. 23 of 1986 amended as the PGC Act, Chapter P30, Law of the Federation of Nigeria in 2004 is the main law which provides for the licensing and control of Private Security Companies (PSC's) in Nigeria. The Act provides for the establishment of a regulatory authority for PSCs in the country. The Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) Act 2003 and its amendment of 2007, complement the PGCs Act. Other laws that supplement the PGC Act include Labour Laws, the Nigerian Penal Code, the Criminal Code, and the Firearms (special provisions) Act (Cap. C38. Cap. F28.

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Cap. E18. Cap. R11.) Further issues with regard to the policies and legal framework for PSCs in Nigeria include[1]:

- *Qualifications and training* – The *Private Guards Act* states that PSCs' training must be approved by the Minster of Internal Affairs. In practice, however, there are no required standards of training, which varies widely across the sector.

- *Wages and working conditions* – Wages and working conditions are generally low and often exploitative (commonly much less than the minimum wage), leading to a low level of commitment and service from guards.

- *Monitoring and review* – There is little monitoring, regulation or oversight of standards in the sector. The main exception is the conditions are generally low and often exploitative, leading to a low level of commitment and service from guards. There are frequent inspections of international PSCs, which, however, appear to involve an element of harassment.

- *Industry associations* – There are a number of industry associations which seek to promote higher standards and new legislation to regulate the sector. Private Security Companies.

Nigeria has a plethora of PSC's. Although a few of the biggest claim to have a nationwide coverage, the reality is that none of them can actually demonstrate a presence and capability in every state. The law prohibits a private security guard from being armed with a gun, but he/she is permitted to be armed with a baton or night stick.

Where armed security is considered necessary, a PSC is permitted to sub-contract and bring the NPF's Mobile Police force (MOPOL) into the operational delivery framework. In theory, the private security company then controls the boundaries of MOPOL's actions. Nonetheless, the police retain all their policing

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[1] Abrahamsen, R. and Williams, M., 2005, 'The Globalisation of Private Security: Country Report: Nigeria', University of Wales, Aberystwyth

powers and retain the right to make decisions independently of their contractor's direction.

The potential benefit of a PSC is that it is commercially driven and so might be less susceptible to local or political bias influencing security performance.

3.3. RISKS OF USING PSC'S.

- **Unarmed**. The fact that PSC guards are unarmed means that their utility is necessarily confined to static guarding or to field support in only the safest locations. With the current insecurity, these locations will be limited to certain areas of the major cities and towns.

- **Limited Powers**. Private security guards have no powers of arrest and can only detain, pending attendance by the police.

- **Cost**. As commercial organisations, the contracting of a PSC can be expensive, although there could be economies of scale if a regional or nationwide contract was secured.

3.4. MITIGATIONS:

A wider use of PSC guards can be considered if there is provision in plans for an armed Rapid Response Unit (RRU) on stand-by.

3.4.1. BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR PSC'S.

Private security companies have to live by their reputation. Loss of reputation can lead to major financial impact. Therefore, there is a view that the background checks for potential new employees have greater vigour and scope than might be seen for state and federal security organisations.

3.4.2. TRAINING FOR PSC'S.

Thorough initial training and frequent refresher training reduces the risk of reputational damage. PSC's therefore tend to have a more rigorous selection and training process and more frequent refresher training than will commonly be seen within federal and state security organisations.

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3.4.3. ROE FOR PSC'S.

Private security guards are trained as to their options in response to an incident. However, their options are necessarily limited by the fact that they are unarmed. If used in support of the CoPREP programme, they would be expected to undergo the requisite induction training on ROE.

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3.4.5. PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCIES.

The use of public security organisations depends on the level of threat and their availability against the workload that they are already required to sustain. As an example, the security support of the Police may be sought for South Eastern States but they may be too busy dealing with incidents to spare the manpower. Alternatively, there may be areas into which they would be unwilling to go because of the threat of attack by IPOB/ESN.

Where the security situation is clearly beyond the police's ability to control, the Armed Forces are deployed. The purpose of the military is to defend the territorial integrity of Nigeria. In the North-East, parts of the North-West and North Central region and in the South-East, the operations of AOGs and OCGs has meant that the Government's right to govern is being directly challenged. The military's focus on delivering counter-insurgency operations could mean that they are neither well-disposed to provide security support to the vaccination campaign, nor are their personnel necessarily in the correct frame of mind to comply with the exacting boundaries of the MoU and the requirements of the World Bank's ESS 4.

3.4.6. RISKS OF USING A PSA

The risks in using regular federal security agencies are linked directly to the level of insecurity in a particular state and the levels of disruption to normal life that might have been generated as a consequence of the framework

operations already in play to quell the insecurity. The perception of the security forces' actions by the civilian community is critical. Where there is already suspicion and distrust of a particular security agency, their use as a security provider could contribute to a reluctance by the community to participate in the vaccination programme as well as being a potential cause of friction or protest.

However, where the security agency is already accepted as a force for good, they will be absolutely key to ensuring access to contested areas and their use would be axiomatic to meeting programme objectives.

Mitigation: Any state or national level agreement between public security bodies and CoPREP would require detailed and careful planning with senior command to agree and define the role and its limitations. This would include the need for full acceptance of ROE and signed acknowledgement of the content of the MoU.

3.4.7. BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR PSA'S.

Selection procedures for federal security agencies should be extremely thorough. Unfortunately, however, there is historic precedence for nepotism, resulting in recruit selection based on 'who you know' rather than baseline competency. The risk of poor background checks can be mitigated if there is a strong chain of command and thorough pre-deployment induction training.

3.4.8. TRAINING FOR PSA'S.

The NPF has a woeful record of incompetence and poor weapon handling skills, exacerbated by institutional corruption, misappropriation of funds, inconsistent salary payments, mismanagement and misuse of personnel for personal gain. The void created by this state of affairs has had to be filled by the military. The military are trained to fight. Their lack of policing skills has led to frequent reported incidents of excessive use of force.

Both police and military personnel will need to undergo extensive orientation training prior to their deployment in support of the vaccination programme to ensure they are fully conversant with both the guidelines of the WB's ESS4 and the rules of engagement applicable to the programme's security management.

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3.4.9. ROE FOR PSA'S.

Federal security agencies should already operate under clear rules of engagement. However, history shows that both the police and the military are particularly poorly equipped for crowd management short of an armed response. In all instances, but particularly where there is clear risk of friction with the local community, the ROE needs to be fully understood and rigorously applied.

4. REGIONAL REVIEW OF DELIVERY.

4.1. INTRODUCTION.

This section consists of a review of the current situation in each of the 6 focus states and provides recommendations on security improvements which will ultimately align with the coordinated security support engaged by CoPREP state teams and to which this SMF will ultimately apply.

The security recommendations given for each state are the minimum acceptable to CoPREP and must be put in place in advance of the start of each state's vaccination programme delivery.

Section 6 then provides more generic guidance to states on the SMF format.

4.2. NORTHERN REGION / NORTHWEST (SOKOTO).

4.2.1. SITUATION OVERVIEW.

The vaccination programme in Sokoto is delivered at General Hospitals and Primary Healthcare Centres (PHCs) at community/ward level. The challenges associated with vaccine roll out principally relate to security concerns and false news associated with vaccine administration, limiting access to certain locations and causing vaccine hesitancy respectively. Of the 23 LGAs in the state, at least 5 of them (eastern side of the state) are significantly impacted with activities of organised criminal groups (OCGs). While LGAs like Isa, Sabon Birni, Rabah, Goronyo, Gudu are considered High risk LGAs, Kebbe, Tureta, Binji, Silame, Dange Shuni, Illela and Gwadabawa are rated Medium. Some territorially contested areas in Isa and Sabon Birni, where armed groups were reported to have appointed village heads, remain very difficult to reach. This has forced the vaccination team to resort to:

- A major use of local staff from those local communities under the influence of armed groups. The local staff are known to the OCGs and their presence to deliver the vaccine programme is therefore accepted.

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- Cluster approach - Vaccination centres are centralised at safer locations at LGA level. Intended beneficiaries are informed of the locations through media sensitization on how, where and when to come to the cluster hub to access the vaccines programme.

4.2.2. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL.

Even though the joint task force on COVID-19 considered as the response team at the state constitutes stakeholders from the ministry of health, SPHCDA, security agencies as well as traditional institutions, not much liaison related to access and incident management is seen to be functional with regards to security supervision and control of either private or public security

4.2.3. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES.

For physical security and access control enforcement at the state cold store, the state uses local civil servants for guard duties, deploying 2 each for day and night. It was noted that these guards had received little or no training as no access control measures were taken during the period of visit. One individual was significantly absent from his duty post whilst the other was not adequately kitted. Upon inquiry, they are reported to have received periodic training (an average of once yearly) by NSCDC. There were no records of private security guards being used for either vaccine storage safety, vaccine deployment or at vaccination points.

Sokoto state currently has no security (private or public) in support of vaccine delivery. Currently, the e-health Africa team is utilised to conduct routine vaccine delivery to LGAs without escorts. On occasion, local government cold chain officers (LCCOs) come to the state capital for vaccine pick up. The LCCOs do operate with security support. The eHealth Africa team relies on an intelligence led security risk management for their movement and access, which is provded by the organisation's security provider, a private firm.

4.2.4. PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCIES.

Federal security agencies are only used for incident management at the LGA level. They are not engaged in vaccine delivery, protection duties at vaccination points or crowd control. At the peak of COVID-19 pandemic, the state constituted a joint task force where federal security agencies (NPF,

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NSCDC, FRSC, DSS) were mandated with border patrol and enforcement of lockdown, with similar structures at the LGA level. So, although there is a COVID-19 emergency preparedness and response team at the state and LGA level which comprises security agencies, traditional institutions and the ministry of health/SPHCDA, there is very limited engagement with security agencies for vaccine roll out or response.

4.2.5. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

- Public (armed) security should be sought for all programme delivery in OCG contested states in the North-West.

- An assessment of the perception of local population on security forces to be used for vaccine roll out must be conducted during sensitisation by a project security representative to reduce potential friction during programme delivery.

- Adequate induction training on crowd control must be offered to public security agencies complementing vaccine roll out at clinics, even though this remains unlikely to be required.

- At vaccination points, uniformed security personnel should not be armed in the immediate vicinity of vaccination.

- The project security adviser must coordinate the deployment and response duties of uniformed personnel when required, but with particular reference to the eastern part of the state.

- Civil servants performing guard duties at cold chain storage sites should either receive proper training or be replace by PSC guards.

  o Guards should be of an age and physical fitness appropriate to the role.

  o They should also be well kitted with appropriate uniform and equipment.

  o A minimum requirement of 3 guards' day/night must also be met.

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4.3. NORTHERN REGION / NORTHEAST (BORNO).

4.3.1. SITUATION OVERVIEW.

The activities of armed groups threaten human security as well as crippling economic and social activities. The threat has forced people to desert their homes to live with relatives or as IDPs in relatively safer zones. Despite the capabilities of the AOGs, the state government's current rehabilitation, resettlement, and reconstruction (RRR) objective has seen all IDP camps within Maiduguri town closed and the displaced persons resettled to their homes/communities.

Findings from the World Health Organisation and other humanitarian actors in Borno, indicate that out of the 27 LGAs in the state, 3 LGAs (Abadam, Guzamala and Marte) are inaccessible and remain 'No Go'. Four (4) LGAs (MMC, Bayo, Kwaya Kusar and Shangi) are fully accessible while the remaining LGAs are contested and only partially accessible. Access to contested LGAs is largely only possible using armed SF escorts or the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS). There are 311 political wards in the state, out of which 205 of them are either fully or partially accessible and the remaining totally inaccessible due to the presence and activities of armed opposition groups. While the 'No Go' LGAs remain inaccessible due to the presence of armed groups, personnel of the SPHCDA and its INGO partners who are resident in local communities, mostly at the LGA headquarters, ensure vaccine administration at those parts of the LGAs.

4.3.2. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL.

Access to troubled LGA's in Borno is largely facilitated by the military. Travel along major highways in Borno is high risk, prompting the military to schedule routine convoy escort duties for road travellers. However, there is no dedicated arrangement with SF authorities for COVID-19 emergency preparedness and response staff and vaccine deployment by road in Borno.

4.3.3. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES.

No private security is currently used. At the state cold room store local civil servants are used for guard duties. The same approach is also used at the LGA level where civil servants provide guard duties.

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The majority of LGAs in Borno are accessed using military escorts. Road transport that LCCOs coming to the state to pick up vaccines and delivering same to the LGAs using the general SF escorts provided to the general public after collecting due cargo clearance from the Theatre command. On the other hand, when delivering vaccines using UNHAS, this is never required.

4.3.4. PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCIES.

While road travels for staff along Maiduguri-Damaturu, Maiduguri-Monguno, Maiduguri-Bama and Maiduguri-Ngala roads does not require any form of clearance, the same travels along these roads for cargo requires SF clearance. On the other hand, staff travel and cargo delivery along Maiduguri-Damboa road requires both military clearance and SF escort. However, SF provision of escort duties terminates at the LGA headquarters where the battalion is based. From here, LCCOs have to transport vaccines to communities without escorts even though the LGA headquarters is the only location within acceptable risk limits.

4.3.5. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

- Public Security to be engaged for all vaccine delivery, particularly in LGA's identified as contested and only partially accessible.

- Where vaccine delivery is to go beyond the LGA headquarters, adequate arrangements must be made with the battalion responsible for that general area to provide security support.

- An independent arrangement, possibly made at Ministerial level, should be sought for general military support to programme delivery in the North East.

- A pre-assessment of the local population's perception of the military must be conducted by project security adviser to gauge potential resistance and prevent targeted attacks.

- Adequate training on crowd control must be offered to public security agencies complementing vaccine roll out at clinics- even though this remains unlikely required.

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- At vaccination points, armed security personnel must be confined to outer cordon duties where possible.

- Project security adviser must maintain regular liaison with uniformed security personnel for deployment and response when required. In Borno, this is preferably the military as they have a wider coverage and a greater capability for responding to attacks.

- Adequate liaison must be conducted in coordinating cargo (vaccine) deployment by forward planning and obtaining proper clearance from the Theatre command.

- Civil servants performing guard duties at cold store must have regular training on access control, patrol, being courteous, firm and general guard duties:

  - Guards should be of an age and physical fitness appropriate to the role.

  - They should also be well kitted with appropriate uniform and equipment.

  - A minimum requirement of 3 guards' day/night must also be met.

4.4. MIDDLE BELT / NORTH CENTRAL (NIGER).

4.4.1. SITUATION OVERVIEW.

The northern boundary of Niger state borders some of the most insecure areas of the northwest where organized criminal groups (OCGs) operating in Kaduna, Zamfara and Kebbi states seek to hibernate in Niger state's northern LGAs when security force operations force them to temporarily vacate their normal areas of operation. Since 2019, a more permanent presence of OCGs has developed in several LGAs of the state. The LGAs of Mariga, Rafi, Shiroro, Munya, Washegu and Kontagora are some of the most impacted LGAs. They are rated High risk (no LGA is presently considered 'No Go') as the hinterlands in these LGAs remain the most concerning flashpoints. Given this, access to Primary HealthCare Centres (PHCs) at community/ward level is largely impacted which has reportedly reduced vaccine coverage in the state.

4.4.2. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL.

Although the joint task force on COVID-19 is considered as the response team for the state and contains stakeholders from the ministry of health, SPHCDA, security agencies as well as traditional institutions, not much liaison related to access and incident management is seen to be functional with regards to security supervision and control of either private or public security.

4.4.3. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES.

For physical security and access control enforcement at state cold store, local civil servants and a private security firm - '**PROFILE SECURITY'** - provide static security guard duties. The guard duty by day is provided by the private security firm and a joint guard duty is provided at night by both. Reportedly, the private security firm has been providing the stated guard duty for over 4 years.

No security (private or public) is currently being provided for vaccine delivery. The current structure sees local government cold chain officers (LCCOs) come to the state capital for vaccine pick up for their LGAs, using icepacks. In the same vein, vaccines are also taken to PHCs from LGAs by vaccination teams without security on escort duty.

4.4.4. PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCIES.

Even though Federal security agencies maintain a presence at local communities level, there is no formal arrangements for security support to vaccination teams in the state. Findings indicate they are not engaged in vaccine delivery, protection duties at vaccination points or crowd control. However, local vigilantes in selected communities in the north of the state have escorted emergency response teams for contact tracing in locations that are difficult to access.

4.4.5. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

- Public Security should be engaged for all vaccine delivery particularly in the northern LGAs of the state due to complex security situation.

- There must be adequate liaison between vaccination teams, LCCOs and NSCDC/Police at LGA level in order to provide security coordination and incident management prior to vaccine delivery.

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- A pre-assessment of the local population's perception of security agencies must be conducted by project security adviser to gauge potential resistance and prevent targeted attacks.

- Adequate training on crowd control must be offered to public security agencies complementing vaccine roll out at clinics, even though this risk remains unlikely.

- At vaccination points, uniformed security personnel must not be seen to carry firearms in the immediate vicinity of vaccination.

- Project security adviser must maintain regular liaison with uniformed security personnel for deployment and response when required. In Borno, this is preferably the military as they have a wider coverage and a greater capability for responding to attacks.

- Adequate liaison must be conducted in coordinating cargo (vaccine) deployment by forward planning and obtaining proper clearance from the Theatre command.

- Civil servants performing guard duties at cold store must have regular training on access control, patrol, being courteous, firm and general guard duties:

    o Guards should be of an age and physical fitness appropriate to the role.

    o They should also be well kitted with appropriate uniform and equipment.

    o A minimum requirement of 3 guards' day/night must also be met.

4.5. CENTRAL BELT / SOUTHEAST (EBONYI).

4.5.1. SITUATION OVERVIEW.

The major threat in the state and region is Political risk which is rated as High. This is due to the coming 2023 election and the possibility of it affecting the vaccination process adversely. This factor alone could affect other factors like civil unrest, kidnap, corruption, and terrorism. Ebonyi experiences a lot of communal clashes usually along ethnic lines, however, the election will

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increase friction along pollical lines and more widespread. In communities like Oruku, Ikpo and Onisha LGA, the IPOB and ESN have considerable influence among peoples of the southeast. This influence is steeped in fear of violence from these groups. Sit-at-home orders by the groups are enforced through violence. Although the groups have been indifferent to the vaccination except if there are interactions like carrying out vaccinations during sit-at-home days or accidental encounters during vaccination exercises. Politicization of the vaccination process like through close interaction with political groups could increase spotlight on the vaccination process by these violent groups.

There are elevated levels of general mistrust for security personnel which is based on both historical Biafra civil war era views and recent government security crackdown on Biafra separatists in the region which have led to some collateral casualties among the population. Heavy handedness of security personnel like the police and military have further reinforced this mistrust among local people.

Ebonyi office report of a workforce shortage. This is evident in the last COVID-19 vaccination exercise where teams had to work long hours to cover the state. The rapid response team also struggled to respond to cases. A shortage of vehicles was also a major issue for the state especially to hard-to-reach locations. The state further pointed out that support they got from the local government offices throughout the state may not be there in the next vaccination exercise because the local government staff did not receive any renumerations which impacted on their motivation to want to do the job in the future.

4.5.2. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL.

Security supervision in the southeast at the initial stages of the vaccination programme were carried out under the COVID 19 State task force comprising of the police, NSCDC, Traditional institutions, Local Government offices, SPHCDA, and the Ministry of Health. At later stages of the vaccination, this was led mainly by the SPHCDA with occasional support from the NSCDC at the community level.

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4.5.3. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES.

Private security management in Ebonyi is mainly used at the State Ministry of Health at the COVID 19 cold storage facility and the Ministry building itself. They support the State Ministry of Health Staff within a secure section where the cold room is located. They manage access to where the vaccine and other immunization equipment are stored. The guards do not carry arms but are supported by armed MOPOLs guarding the entire Secretariat complex.

4.5.4. PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCIES.

Government security relation is cordial and are occasionally called upon to provide support to field vaccination exercises. At the start of the vaccination programme in the state, police and NSCDC were occasionally deployed to escort some vaccination teams to high-risk locations but were used less and less as the programme went on until they were not used at all. The NSCDC provide support in locations where crowd control was required. NSCDC staff at local governments carried out sensitization efforts for the SPHCDP within their areas of operations.

4.5.5. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

For the Vaccination Teams, training and guidance were provided by IDA at the early stages of the vaccination in 2021. The NSCDC were provided training on rules of engagement, crowd control and escalation procedures for few officers.

- NSCDC to be engaged to provide programme support under the terms of the MoU.

- Security staff to undergo proper pre-deployment induction training.

4.6. SOUTHERN REGION / SOUTH SOUTH (RIVERS).

4.6.1. SITUATION OVERVIEW.

With the 2023 elections fast approaching, politics all influence vaccination activities either directly or indirectly. Rivers state is a politically conscious state led by a highly charismatic Governor in Nesom Wike. The governor is highly influential among Rivers people and his support for the vaccination process will go a long way. Two other major risks identified for the state and region are

Kidnap and Crime which are both high risks. Several Niger Delta Militant groups operate in Rivers and the South-south region, they have been quiet over the past few years but are usually more active during election cycles.

A major deployment issue faced by the Rivers vaccination teams are additional training and logistics. Staff suffer from inadequate logistical support for vaccine programmes. Vital activities like movement of vaccines either from the airport to storage facilities or distribution to vaccine administration locations around the state has been a major challenge. The Modena vaccine, which has a 30-day expiry period has been difficult to administer, especially given the logistical challenges.

There is need for increased sensitization work at the local community level to combat false news. Strong religious and traditional beliefs had added to communication issues experienced in the state. Religious and traditional groups need to be taken along as stakeholders in combating false information on the COVID-19 vaccination. Government agencies like the NOA should be involved in the sensitization efforts.

4.6.2. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL.

The State Ministry of Health has a Security Committee whose members include the police, State Primary Health Care Board, DSS, Military and Navy. Although this committees it appears is not primarily focused on the COVID 19 vaccination but on security in general. The Committee hold regular meetings to discuss security challenges and vaccination programme is discussed as part of the security challenges.

Although the State Primary Healthcare Board have operated semi-independently from the Ministry of Health and handled its security through mediation channels instead. The State Primary Health Care Board claimed not experienced major security challenges as thus have not called upon the security support this far in the programme. At the local government level, the Local Government Chairman's office is said to be responsible for security support for vaccination within his area of control.

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4.6.3. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES.

Private security guard company provide security at the State Primary Health Care Board facility as well as the COVID19 storage section manned by 2 guards at any one time. These guards oversee the entry and exit protocol of the cold storage area through logbooks. They manage the generator 24 hours a day as well as the fire safety system of the facility. The private guards are unarmed but supported by armed MOPOL officers at the main gate of the facility.

4.6.4. PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCIES.

From Assessment carried out there is a relationship between the public security agencies and the vaccination project teams, however, this has not been a formal relationship. The Office of the State Commissioners of Police say they are occasionally invited to provide support by the Ministry but not to be part of the vaccination process. The NSCDC on the other hand have a formal relationship but only at the local government level where they have provided support in form of crowd control. A police unit of three policemen and a patrol pickup is stationed at the gate of the SPHCDB compound 24 hours a day.

4.6.5. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

For the Vaccination Teams, training and guidance were provided for by IDA at the early stages of the vaccination in 2021. The NSCDC were provided extensive training on rules of engagement, crowd control and escalation procedures.

4.7. SOUTHERN REGION / SOUTHWEST (LAGOS).

4.7.1. SITUATION OVERVIEW.

Criminality is the major risk identified for the state. Its large metropolitan population is a breeding ground for criminal groups. Crimes such as mugging, burglary, fraud, pickpocketing, armed robbery and other violent crime are common around slum areas of the state. Vaccination teams are at risk of being targeted during field activities and mitigation measures like awareness training, information sharing, and proper coordination are important to reduce this risk.

Civil Unrest risk can be a significant threat to project staff working in Lagos as the state is very active with protests and demonstrations. The EndSARS protests of 2020 led to the complete breakdown of activities in the state. This happened during the fuel price increase of 2012 as well. The federal Government have announced plans to remove fuel subsidies. I fit occurs, this will lead to an increase in the price of petrol and other petroleum products. This is likely to lead to protests and demonstrations in the state. Proper planning and awareness of vaccination staff is needed for a safe vaccination.

The 2023 General elections will cause major disruptions in the country and particularly in Lagos, which is a hotbed for political violence and thuggery. The biggest threat however is government interference or attempt to use the vaccination process for political gain. Proper guidelines on non-partisan government relationships should be known to the vaccination project teams. Small actions, such as individual staff wearing clothing or items that show political affiliations during vaccination, or staff appearing with political persons or groups during political events, could mislead public towards associating the vaccination programme with these groups.

4.7.2. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL.

Not enough information was gathered to comment effectively as there was a general lack of interest in engaging or willingness to help from the Lagos state Ministry of Health and State Primary Health Care Board during the state assessment. Interviews with the State Commissioner of Police and the State Commandant of the NSCDC were insufficient to build sufficient information of the inner workings of the State Vaccination programme.

4.7.3. PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES.

There was lack of engagement from the Lagos state Ministry of Health and State Primary Health Care Board during the state assessment. We were unable to visit the State Primary Health Care Board or the COVID19 storage facility. We were neither provided opportunity to ask questions on the security arrangements at these facilities.

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4.7.4. PUBLIC SECURITY AGENCIES.

In discussions with the State Commissioner of Police, the police do not work with the vaccination teams directly but provide a general security support to the programme. They have been invited in the past to provide advice to the vaccination teams but have not been called on for any major threats. The NSCDC have been active both in the provision of minor security functions like crowd control at the start of the vaccination programme which later became unnecessary due to a change in the Lagos state vaccination strategy emphasises the use of all available public facilities as vaccination centres as well as the use of a targeted vaccinations, testing and isolation.

This has drastically reduced the security challenges that are encountered when people are directed to primary health care centres alone. NSCDC have also been active in the sensitization process at the local government level.

4.7.5. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.

For the Vaccination Teams, training and guidance were provided by IDA during the early stages of the vaccination in 2021. The NSCDC were provided extensive training on rules of engagement, crowd control and escalation procedures. This section is required to be updated once the necessary engagement has been arranged with the various agencies mentioned above.

5. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

5.1. INTRODUCTION.

It is clear, from the review of state level vaccine programme delivery in the six regionally representative states detailed in para 4 above, that there is great variance in security arrangements and, in most cases, the in-place security is insufficient to mitigate the identified risks. So, in line with best practice, CoPREP requires the establishment of a formal, pan-programme security architecture. Guidance and security coordination will come from federal level but the detailed design and management is to be delivered at state level.

Each state is to develop a state level security management plan based on the guidelines given in this SMF and formatted to the SMP template provided in Annex I – 'Guidelines for a Security Management Plan'.

Each state must establish a relationship with their selected security agency and define responsibilities with regard to support, working relationships, roles and limits of jurisdiction. This should be formalised in a signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). A MoU template for the programme is provided at Annex H.

The minimum benchmark levels of security are to be applied to the field phases of the vaccination programme, for all parts of the country and irrespective of the assessed risk level. So, as a minimum, all field programmes should work to a standard deployment plan involving a sequenced schedule of delivery by LGA. The following steps are to be taken:

- Pre-deployment of sensitisation, records and logistics team with security force and establishment of a security cordon.

- Establish PHC logistical layout (queue lines, ID validation point, entry point, vaccination lanes, recovery area, exit point)

- Deployment of vaccination team and vaccine stock.

- Vaccination process between set times.

- Controlled access/Egress of stakeholders throughout.

- Withdrawal of teams each afternoon.

- Possible overnight security piquet (vigilantes?) left in place.

6. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

6.1. COPREP SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.

CoPREP will engage a security company to take on the responsibility for coordinating all the State security arrangements in accordance with the SMF. This will be both at the regional level and state level as shown in the diagram below. To deliver the training workload, there will be a security manager for North, Central and Southern belts. In turn, state teams are to nominate a Security Focal Point to oversee security during deployment and to coordinate security with the relevant security agency.

CoPREP SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Suggested Terms of Reference for the selection of security personnel to fill these roles is provided in Annex F.

6.2. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES.

State teams and security agencies are to work to a generic set of CoPREP Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) which will then be adapted to accommodate state specific security challenges. The SOPs should cover the following topics:

- Vehicles and Equipment.
- Travel Management.
- Security Force Orders.

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- Delivery Site Security.

- Communications.

- Vetting.

- Medical Plan.

- Fire Safety.

- Occupational H&S.

6.3. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS.

In order to respond to a sudden adverse change in the security situation, or as a result of incident or accident, there is a requirement for a set of Emergency Response Plans (ERP's). These documents explain the sequence of response to an event and the detail needs to be known by both CoPREP personnel and the supporting security agency. These plans will be briefed to stakeholders during the induction training phase.

- Major Incident (Bomb, Armed attack).

- Kidnap.

- Civil unrest.

- Medical Emergency.

- RTA.

- Natural Disaster.

6.4. RAPID RESPONSE PLANS.

Whichever security organisation is selected to support a state vaccination programme (associated with the level of threat), a mobile armed rapid response unit is to be put in place to quickly deploy in the event of a serious incident.

According to the level of insecurity, this could be a road deployed MOPOL unit or a heliborne military unit. Also, the unit, or more than one unit, might need to be forward located, dependent on accessibility and level of risk.

The rules for deployment of armed response and the authorisation procedure are to be written into ERPs. The Rapid Response Unit(s) must also have undergone the induction training and must fully comply with ROE.

6.5. TRAINING SYLLABUS.

In order to ensure unity of purpose, all vaccination programme delivery stakeholders must undergo a common induction programme. The syllabus will ensure that all parties understand the aims of the programme in each state and that all parties understand the specific roles and functional boundaries of supporting agencies.

The syllabus is to include:

- Programme aims and delivery timelines.

- Roles and responsibilities.

- Scheme of delivery.

- SOPs and ERPs.

- Coursework focused on national law.

- Stakeholder rights.

- Understanding special needs of stakeholders and stakeholders with disabilities.

- Conflict de-escalation techniques.

- Ethics as per WB ESS4[2].

- Implicit bias training.

- Diversity and cultural awareness.

- Trauma-informed responses.

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[2]WB Environmental & Social Framework (2016) – Environmental & Social Standard No 4 (ESS4) – Community Health & Safety

- Programme security management framework

- Security management and means of communication.

- Bounds of security responsibility.

- Rules of Engagement.

For Security Agency training, a suggested Code of Conduct and Rules of Engagement are provided Annex G – 'Code of Conduct for Security Operatives'.

6.6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION.

The security agency selected to support a state vaccination programme will be independently performance assessed against the CoPREP national performance benchmarks at intervals during the programme delivery period. The assessment will be conducted by independent assessors.

The assessors will either be security consultants, representatives from a national civil society organisation or personnel from an international NGO, as approved by the World Bank.

The aims of the evaluation will be to ensure compliance with WB ESS4, the MoU and the ROE, adherence to the provisions contained in the VPs, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.

Identified shortfalls will be raised to ensure prompt adjustment of procedures and appropriate sanction where necessary.

6.7. VETTING OF COMPANIES/AGENCIES.

Where a security agency has a record of allegations, or has a history of convictions, it must demonstrate that none of the personnel to be involved in security support to the programme are currently under any form of past conviction or pending prosecution for human rights abuse. Guidance on staff vetting best practice is provided in Annex E.

Where there is any doubt, the security organisation must be made responsible (within the clauses of the MoU) for ensuring appropriate remedial action to regain transparency.

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CoPREP will ensure that vetting oversight is conducted by the same independent organization selected to conduct the security agency performance assessment.

6.8. SECURITY DELIVERY SEQUENCING.

6.8.1. PRE-DEPLOYMENT.

The state level security related activities prior to programme deployment are to include:

- Community liaison and intelligence gathering to identify marginal and no-go Wards/LGAs.

- Monitoring and evaluation of security agency vetting and recruiting procedures.

- Stakeholder induction training to ensure a common understanding of roles, responsibilities and boundaries.

- Development of a security management plan that mitigates identified local risks.

- Community sensitisation through delivery of a strategic communications information package.

6.8.2. DEPLOYMENT.

The security activities during the deployment phase are to include:

- Coordinated journey management.

- Compliance with SOPs and ERPs.

- Monitoring and evaluation of security agency delivery and performance.

- Continuous liaison with local community stakeholders.

- Incident response.

- Dissemination of security information to all stakeholders on a need-to-know basis (via WhatsApp).

6.8.3. POST-DEPLOYMENT.

Security activities after completion of programme delivery are to include:

- Debrief of security agency's commanders to identify issues and concerns.

- Post-deployment review and identification of any lessons that will prompt a change of operating procedure for future delivery programmes.

- Management and resolution of any grievances raised against the security agencies.

6.8.4. INCIDENT REPORTING AND INQUIRIES.

The programme has a standard procedure for reporting both incidents and near misses. Apart from the provision of, and training on, a reporting template, stakeholders are to adopt a proactive mindset on identifying a 'near miss'. Both a near miss and an actual incident are to be reported promptly via the security management team.

Inculcation of the correct ethos for incident identification and reporting can only be achieved through proper induction training and subsequent regular refresher training.

6.8.5. JOURNEY MANAGEMENT.

The 6 x SRAs all identify high risk associated with travel, particularly road travel, ranging from RTA to robbery, carjacking and kidnap. These ubiquitous risks can only be mitigated by proper journey planning and management.

Journey management will be centrally coordinated and devolved down to individual states where appropriate. Whichever system is adopted, project vehicles are to be tracked and project staff need to follow a formatted reporting sequence to update progress on their journey. Ideally, project vehicles need to be fitted with trackers. This equipment allows the operations room to track a vehicle's progress during a journey. Modern trackers can also include a panic button and microphone activation. Trackers also have utility in monitoring driving hours and identifying vehicle misuse.

The travel management SOP provides guidance on vehicle maintenance and safety equipment, journey planning, timings for safest movement, safe havens and driver training.

7. LOGISTICS AND SERVICE SUPPORT.

7.1. TRANSPORT FOR STAFF.

Prior to travel, the following trip management planning needs to be conducted:

- Vehicle numbers, types and registration numbers.

- Allocation of Driver s by name.

- Meeting points/pick up plan.

- Security agency Escorts.

- Timings.

- Routes.

- Recovery plan.

- Vehicle maintenance and fuelling.

- Overnight parking plan.

7.2. STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION.

The SPHCDA is responsible for the management of the cold chain from central delivery in state all the way through to delivery of vaccinations to stakeholders.

The security provider is responsible for the safe transportation of vaccines between depots in the cold chain but is not to be made responsible for storage depot security unless it is not otherwise already in place.

7.3. EQUIPMENT.

7.3.1. SECURITY PERSONNEL.

Selected security agencies should have the following equipment according to role and the security threat:

- Proper uniform

- Weapon and ammunition or Baton

- ID card

- Radio (commanders)

- ROE (card format)

- Where needed (and subject to risk appetite):

    o Helmet with visor.

    o Riot shield.

    o Tear gas.

    o Cameras.

    o Body armour.

7.3.2. COPREP EQUIPMENT.

The SPHCDA is responsible for all distribution vehicles, fuelling and maintenance. The security provider is responsible for providing an escort where required.

A failure of power could cause the loss of large batches of vaccine due to heat damage. The SPHCDA is responsible for cold chain power supply and associated power back up.

8. COMMUNICATIONS.

8.1. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT PLAN.

The communication strategy is to be both nationwide and constant in advance of targeted vaccination roll out at state level. All mediums will be used in order to spread the vaccination programme message (TV, radio, social media, newspapers).

Messaging will include:

- Critical benefits of vaccination.

- The risks to specific ages and those with chronic conditions.

- Expectation management – how long before vaccination delivery will arrive in different communities.

- Validation/ID requirements.

8.2. PROJECT ORIENTATION PLAN.

All personnel employed on the project and all agencies used must be familiar with the following:

- Concept of operations.

- Roles within the team (data collection, stakeholder management, vaccination delivery, logistics)

- Ethos of the programme.

- Behaviour in the field.

- Dress and deportment.

- Personal Security Awareness.

- Role of security services, to include ROE and MoU stipulations.

- Emergency response plans.

9. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES.

9.1. GRIEVANCE REPORTING CHANNELS.

The SPHCDA will communicate the grievance procedure to stakeholders during the communication and sensitisation phase. The following will be provided:

- Telephone:

Stakeholders should call <u>(nominated number)</u> and request to speak to a stakeholder contact officer.

- Email:

Grievances can be sent to: nominated email address

- Face to face:

Stakeholders can voice their grievance to any Programme employee who will then escalate using the correct process.

- Online form:

Stakeholders can complete a grievance form located on our website XXXX.

9.2. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

Grievance Owner:

- Officer investigating the grievance and liaising with the external stakeholder/s.

- Develop resolutions and actions to rectify any issues.

- Follow up and track progress of grievance.

- Document any interactions with external stakeholders.

Stakeholder Contract Officer:

- Receive grievances and assign a grievance owner.

- Make sure the grievance mechanism procedure is being adhered to and followed correctly.

- Maintain grievance register and monitor any correspondence.

- Monitor grievances/trends over time and report findings to the Sustainability Committee.

- Raise internal awareness of the grievance mechanism among employees and contractors.

Vaccination Programme Staff:

- Receive grievances in person.

- Report grievance to the Stakeholder Contact Officer by lodging the Grievance Lodgment Form.

- May provide information and assistance in developing a response and close out of a grievance.

9.3. INVESTIGATING AND REPORTING.

Investigate

The grievance owner is responsible for investigating the grievance. The investigation may require the grievance owner to make site visits, consult employees, contact external stakeholders and complete other activities. Records of meetings, discussions and activities all need to be recorded.

Act

Following the investigation, the grievance owner will use the findings to create an action plan outlining steps to be taken in order to resolve the grievance. The grievance owner is responsible for assigning actions, monitoring actions undertaken and making sure deadlines are adhered to. Once all actions have been completed and the grievance owner feels the grievance has been resolved, they will then formally advise the external stakeholder via their preferred method of contact.

Follow up and close out

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The grievance owner will contact the external stakeholder/s three weeks after the grievance is resolved. When contacting the external stakeholder, the grievance owner will verify that the outcome was satisfied and also gather any feedback on the grievance process. Minutes of the meeting will be recorded and saved.

If required the grievance owner may need to follow up with the external stakeholder on numerous occasions to confirm all parties are satisfied.

Reporting

The NCDC Sustainability committee will receive quarterly updates on stakeholder grievances. Information outlining the number of grievances, time to resolution and outcomes of grievances will be communicated. Grievances will also be reported in NCDCs annual Sustainability Report.

9.4. APPEAL.

If the external stakeholder is unhappy with the resolution and/or does not agree with the proposed actions, then the grievance owner needs to escalate the matter to the executive management team. The executive team will review the grievance and all documentation gathered throughout the investigation and determine whether further actions are required to resolve the grievance.

10. **LIST OF ACRONYMS.**

CoPREP	COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Project
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
GoN	Government of Nigeria
NCDC	Nigeria Center for Disease Control
NPF	Nigerian Police Force
NPHCDA	National Primary Health Care Development Agency
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corp
PCU	Project Coordinating Unit
SMF	Security Management Framework
SRA	Security Risk Assessment
VAC	Vaccination Approval Criteria
WB	World Bank
PHC	Primary Health Center
GH	General Hospital
SF	Security Forces
TTP	Tactic Technique and Procedure
MO	Modus Operandi
OCG	Organized Criminal Group
CMT	Crisis Management Team
K & R	Kidnap and Ransom
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
ESN	Eastern Security Network
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth Development Office
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment

CCTV	Close Circuit Television
CMT	Crisis Management Team
RTA	Road Traffic Accident
MED EVAC	Medical Evacuation
DSS	Department of State Security
LGA	Local Government Area
ROE	Rules of Engagement
APC	All Progressive Congress
CCTV	Close Circuit Television
CMT	Crisis Management Team
CoPREP	COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Project
ESN	Eastern Security Network
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth Development Office
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
GoN	Government of Nigeria
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
ISWAP	Islamic State of West Africa Province
IVCP	Illegal Vehicle Check Point
LGA	Local Government Area
NDM	Niger Delta Militant
NPF	Nigerian Police Force
NPHCDA	National Primary Health Care Development Agency
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corp
OCG	Organized Criminal Groups
PBIED	Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device

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PCU	Project Coordinating Unit
PDP	People's Democratic Party
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RTA	Road Traffic Accident
SMF	Security Management Framework
SRA	Security Risk Assessment
VAC	Vaccination Approval Criteria
VBIED	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
ESN	Eastern Security Network
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth Development Office
CCTV	Close Circuit Television
CMT	Crisis Management Team
RTA	Road Traffic Accident
LGA	Local Government Area
OCG	Organized Criminal Groups
ROE	Rules of Engagement
NDM	Niger Delta Militant
ISWAP	Islamic State of West Africa Province
IVCP	Illegal Vehicle Check Point
PBIED	Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VBIED	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
PDP	People's Democratic Party
APC	All Progressive Congress
PHC	Primary Health Center

GH	General Hospital
SF	Security Forces
TTP	Tactic Technique and Procedure
MO	Modus Operandi
AOG	Armed Opposition Group
CMT	Crisis Management Team
K & R	Kidnap and Ransom
ERW	Explosive Remnant of War
UXO	Unexploded Ordinances
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Support

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